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1. Introductory remarks
This study1 aims at giving a snapshot of the performance of the Visegrad countries 
(V4) in the Þ rst decade of their EU membership and, based on past trends and 
available forecasts, attempts to outline the prospects for their future catching 
up. The evaluation is done along several aspects mainly focusing on growth, 
real and nominal convergence, as well as basic elements of competitiveness. 
The main question of the paper is whether there has been convergence by the 
Visegrad countries to EU averages/benchmarks as well as to each other since 
2004, and whether converging or diverging trends can be expected until the end 
of the decade. 
2. Growth and catching up
The Visegrad countries entered the EU with a GDP growth rate of 5% on average, 
but right after accession they took a diverging trend.2 In fact, Slovakia got the 
biggest impetus from membership, but the Czech and (with the exception of a 
slow-down in 2005) the Polish rates were also impressive in the Þ rst years. The 
* Tudományos fĘmunkatárs, MTA KRTK Világgazdasági Intézet; fĘiskolai docens, IBS 
Nemzetközi Üzleti FĘiskola.
1  This paper was supported by the International Visegrad Fund in the framework of the project 
No. 31210045, entitled “Prospects of the Visegrad cooperation in changing economic, political 
and social conditions”. 
2  Statistical data used here stem from the Eurostat database unless indicated otherwise.  http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/statistics-a-z/abc (consulted in August 2015). 
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Czech and Slovak expansion was fuelled by both domestic demand (especially 
high investment rates) and exports, while in Poland domestic demand was 
the main driver of growth. Only the Hungarian economy showed a steadily 
declining trend after EU entry (with exports being the single stable pillar of 
growth); to suffer from the deepest recession in 2009 (-6.6%). The Czech and 
the Slovak negative GDP rates were also somewhat bigger than the EU average 
of -4.4%, while Poland – due to its robust internal market and lower exposure 
to external effects – was the only country in the group and also across the EU 
to avoid recession at all. 
As Figure 1 illustrates it, in the years of 2010-2013 the four countries have been 
recovering at a higher (Poland, Slovakia) or lower pace (the Czech Republic and 
Hungary experiencing even a milder recession). But the gap among their rates 
has been narrowing lately, and in 2014-2016 – for the Þ rst time since accession 
– the rhythm of economic expansion is becoming harmonious in the region 
(ca. 2-3.5%). Moreover, according to medium-term forecasts by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit,3 the growth rate of the V4 countries from 2017 until 2019 is 
expected to remain within the band of 2.2-3.4% and their cumulated average 
will be around 2.7% in those years. Given the fact that, according to the same 
forecast, the EU28 average growth rate will be 1.9% (and that of the euro area 
slightly lower), the better performance of the V4 will enable a sustainable 
continuation of catching up until the end of the decade. The high pre-crisis 
dynamism is however not to return to the region in the foreseeable future,4 but 
a steady and more modest convergence – supported also by the EU’s Þ nancial 
assistance in the 2014-2020 period5 – can be predicted. As regards the structure 
of growth, according to European Commission forecasts,6 in all four countries 
it will be driven overwhelmingly by domestic demand. Within that, investments 
will take the lead with slightly decreasing trends after the “absorption boom” 
of 2014-2015, however. At the same time, public and private consumption will 
have varied patterns in the V4. Net exports will again contribute positively to 
growth in the three smaller Visegrad countries only, while Poland was not able 
to maintain its post-crisis improving trend of external trade. 
3  Country Reports by the Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2015. 
4  Mainly due to two factors: ailing export partners and lack of „easy” borrowing. IMF (2014), p. 
60. 
5  In the current seven (plus three) year budgetary period, the V4 countries taken together will 
beneÞ t from more 150 billion euros in the form of development assistance (Structural and 
Investment Funds).
6  European Commission (2015a). 
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Convergence of living standards to the EU average has actually been one 
of the major reasons for joining the Union. In this respect, very promising 
trends – measured in GDP per capita – could be detected in the cases of Poland 
and Slovakia (improving equally by 19 percentage points in the Þ rst decade of 
membership). In contrast, the Czech rate remained rather constantly at 80-84% 
compared to the EU average, while the Hungarian catching-up process has been 
a very modest one (up from 62 to 68%).7 As Figure 2 shows it, these developments 
mean two things: an obvious narrowing of the gap within the Visegrad group – 
led by the Czech Republic, followed by Slovakia and Poland-Hungary sharing 
the third place – and a gradual convergence of the V4 as a whole towards the 
EU average. Thus, the development of the region validated the theory of beta 
convergence, according to which poorer countries are capable of higher growth 
rates when catching up, while, the relevance of sigma convergence is shown 
by the narrowing of the gap among the V4 as well as between them and the 
EU average. Furthermore, as it was mentioned, thanks to continuously higher 
growth rates in the second half of the decade, the catching up of the V4 in terms 
of GDP per capita can be continued. This convergence will however happen at a 
far more reduced pace than the Polish and Slovak examples in the past ten years, 
and will be closer to the Hungarian performance demonstrated so far. 
Figure 1: Real GDP growth rate, % Figure 2: GDP/capita in PPS
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2015a)
As regards catching up at the level of regions, the picture is partly similar to 
the national performances (see Table 1).8 This means that the most spectacular 
catching up took place in NUTS-2 regions of Slovakia and Poland while the 
7  If one looks behind the trends and examines Eurostat’s nominal sums of per capita GDP at 
current prices (in euros), then the developments show an even sharper picture. Namely, in the 
case of Poland and Slovakia GDP per capita doubled or more than doubled from 2004 to 2014, 
while in the Czech case the multiplier was 1.56 and for Hungary merely 1.3.
8  Eurostat data for 2004: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-07-23_en.htm?locale=en ; 
Eurostat data for 2013: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6839731/1-21052015-
AP-EN.pdf/c3f5f43b-397c-40fd-a0a4-7e68e3bea8cd 
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Czech and especially the Hungarian regions did not experience a similar 
convergence. Hungary is the only Visegrad country where some regions even 
reported a negative closing up rate in 2013 compared to 2004, and here can be 
found the poorest regions too – which was not the case at the time of accession. 
The regions surrounding the capital cities (or in the Czech Republic the capital 
itself) are the ß agships of catching up. At the same time, it seems to be a shared 
challenge that there is a huge discrepancy in development levels between those 
central regions (reaching well above 100% of EU average – in the Slovak and 
Czech cases closer to 200%) and the overwhelming rest being below 75%. 
Paradoxically, this problem seems to be the gravest in the smallest Visegrad 
country: Slovakia. 
If disregarding the capital cities/regions we can also see that the most 
homogenous country in terms of regional development is the Czech Republic 
(with 15 percentage points discrepancy between the most and the least developed 
regions) while the other three countries struggle with gaps of between ca. 20 
(Slovakia) or even nearly 30 percentage points (Poland and Hungary). The fact 
that regional gaps did not start narrowing, while some regions switched to a high 
gear than others, validates the trade-off theory regarding convergence, according 
to which “…in case a less developed national economy starts to converge to the 
international average, an increase of dispersion will be experienced among the 
domestic regions within the national economy, thus the more developed regions 
will grow faster than the less developed ones.”9
Table 1: Catching up of NUTS-2 regions in the Visegrad countries (2004–2013)
REGION
NUTS-2
GDP/capita 2004,
PPS, EU27=100
GDP/capita 2013,
PPS, EU28=100*
Change
(percentage points)
CZECH REPUBLIC
Praha 157 173 +16
Strední Cechy 70 73 +3
Jihozápad 70 73 +3
Severozápad 61 62 +1
Severovychod 64 68 +4
Jihovychod 67 77 +10
Strední Morava 60 67 +7
Moravskoslezko 61 69 +8
HUNGARY
Közép-Magyarország 102 108 +6
Közép-Dunántúl 61 59 -2
Nyugat-Dunántúl 67 67 0
9  KERTÉSZ (2010). 2. 
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Dél-Dunántúl 46 45 -1
Észak-Magyarország 43 40 -3
Észak-Alföld 42 42 0
Dél-Alföld 44 45 +1
POLAND
Lódzkie 47 63 +16
Mazowieckie 77 107 +30
Malopolskie 43 59 +16
Slaskie 57 70 +13
Lubelskie 35 48 +13
Podkarpackie 35 48 +13
Swietokrzyskie 39 49 +10
Podlaskie 38 49 +11
Wielkopolskie 55 73 +18
Zachodniopomorskie 47 57 +10
Lubuskie 45 56 +11
Dolnoslaskie 52 76 +24
Opolskie 44 54 +10
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 45 56 +11
Warminsko-Mazurskie 39 48 +9
Pomorskie 50 65 +15
SLOVAKIA
Bratislavsky kraj 129 184 +55
Západné Slovensko 53 71 +18
Stredné Slovensko 47 60 +13
Vychodné Slovensko 42 52 +10
Source: Eurostat (2015), *EU27 comparison not available, 
minor changes due to accession of Croatia
Besides the national and regional level achievements, at the citizens’ level 
wage convergence must be mentioned too. In this respect important changes 
took place between 2004 and 2014. First of all, the initially leading position of 
Hungary melted away, and was signiÞ cantly outstripped by the Czech Republic 
and also by Slovakia and Poland. This means that – according to Eurostat 
Þ gures in purchasing power parity – in 2014 the net annual earnings10 reached 
approximately 8,700 euros in the Czech Republic, 8,000 in Slovakia, 7,600 in 
Poland and 6,400 in Hungary. These Þ gures should be contrasted with the 22,000 
euros average earnings in the EU28 in the same year. However, there has been 
some catching up: taken the four Visegrad countries’ average in 2014 (7,700 
euros) it was more than one third of the EU average instead of one fourth in the 
year of accession. In parallel, it must also be mentioned that price convergence 
10 In the category of single persons without children. 
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happened signiÞ cantly faster. By 2012, the prices of communication devices 
and services reached 102%, clothing and footwear 89% while electricity and 
gas 80% of respective price levels of the EU15.11
3. Overview of macroeconomic performance 
When analysing the macroeconomic performance of countries – inß uencing 
their competitiveness too – several factors can be taken into account. Here 
the external balances, labour market indicators, investments, productivity and 
innovation performances will be highlighted shortly. Starting with the external 
balances, there is an obvious difference among the Visegrad countries. The 
three smaller and highly open economies have a much higher ratio of exports 
to GDP – according to 2014 Eurostat Þ gures between ca. 84-92%, reß ecting 
a greater vulnerability – than Poland with its big domestic market and having 
a less than 50% export-to-GDP ratio. The external trade position of these 
countries has varied signiÞ cantly in the Þ rst ten years of membership: the Czech 
Republic has had a goods’ trade surplus practically since accession, but this has 
been the case for Hungary and Slovakia only since 2009 (which was however 
the deepest point in value terms for both exports and imports across the region). 
While export orientation became an important tool to mitigate the effects of the 
crisis12 imports fell back as consumption shrunk in the crisis years – having a 
benign impact on the trade balances of all the Visegrad countries (see Figure 3). 
As however growth is back to the region, it seems to reinforce the dynamism of 
net exports in the smaller Visegrad countries while generates increasingly more 
imports than exports in Poland. This striking gap can mainly be explained by 
the fact that the three smaller Visegrad countries are hosting relatively more 
manufacturing plants run by foreign investors who realise the overwhelming 
part of their exports, than in the case of Poland. In parallel to these important 
changes, some geographical reorientation of exports has been taking place in the 
V4 since accession. While these countries are (by ca. 10-20 percentage points) 
more integrated into the EU markets than the EU average itself – testifying that 
the V4 is very far from being a periphery in economic terms – Table 2 shows 
a signiÞ cant retreat from their traditional export markets towards news ones, 
as a result of protracted recovery of the euro area. This outward orientation 
11 KOTIAN–MÜNZ (2014) 
12 NOVÁK (2012) 
183Krisztina Vida: Analysing Catching-up Trends of the Visegrad Countries…
actually goes hand-in-hand with the same trend at the EU level.  In the case of 
the Visegrad countries, exports – especially in the period of 2009-2013 – picked 
up mainly in the direction of Russia, Ukraine, China and Turkey.13 However, as 
the core of the EU is recovering and due to the Ukrainian crisis coupled with 
sanctions against Russia, the mentioned trend started to get reversed in 2014.
Table 2: Share of EU exports in total exports
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EU28 68.8 68 68.6 68.5 67.7 66.9 65.4 64.5 62.8 62.1 63.3
CZ 87.7 86.1 86.2 85.8 85.4 85.2 84.3 83.4 81.3 81.1 82.2
HU 84.4 82.3 80.7 80.4 79.8 80.2 78.4 77.4 77.4 77.8 79.8
PL 80.6 78.9 79.3 79.2 78.1 79.9 79.3 78.2 76.2 75 77.1
SK 87.2 87.6 87.3 87.2 85.8 86.3 84.7 85.1 84.1 82.9 84.4
Source: Eurostat
Connected with trade performances, the current account balances (Figure 4) 
have been improving in the post crisis years in the V4, but since 2013 Poland 
seems to take a downward trend again. When looking deeper into the composition 
of the balances of the current account, the following speciÞ cities (beyond 
trade in goods) can be stated. As regards trade in services, it has recently been 
positive in all Visegrad countries. As to income ß ows, due to substantial proÞ t 
repatriations of foreign-owned companies, all V4 countries have deÞ cits which 
cannot be counterbalanced by the relatively low level of net transfers (despite 
the net beneÞ ciary status of the V4 in the EU budget). The latter is the highest 
in Poland due to signiÞ cant remittances of Polish workers from abroad, while 
it is negative in Slovakia which has to contribute to the eurozone’s rescue fund. 
Finally, an important remark on Hungary’s good performance in this respect: 
from the V4 Hungary is by far the biggest outward investor in share of GDP,14 
meaning that returns on its investments make a signiÞ cant positive contribution 
to the current account. 
13 ÉLTETė (2014)
14 According to Eurostat, this rate in 2012 amounted to: 29% for Hungary (up from 5.4% in 
2004!), 11.4% for Poland, 8.6% for the Czech Republic and only 5.1% for Slovakia. 
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Figure 3: Trade balance in goods,
 % of GDP
Figure 4: Balance of the current 
account, % of GDP
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2015a)
Investments play a crucial role in macroeconomic developments. In the year 
of accession, the three smaller Visegrad countries started with rather close 
GDP-ratios of gross Þ xed capital formation (24-28%), while Poland was lagging 
behind them (18%). Then, as Figure 5 demonstrates it, Poland, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic increased or preserved their levels, while the Hungarian 
one took a declining path. Later on, the crisis resulted in lowering investments 
across the Visegrad region, similarly to the EU as a whole. So, what has been 
the reason for that? 
Figure 5: Gross Þ xed capital formation, 
% of GDP
Figure 6: FDI stock in the reporting 
economy, % of GDP
Source: Eurostat
Figure 6 testiÞ es that it was not due to a decline in foreign direct investments: 
looking at FDI stocks as percent of GDP – even if through some ups and downs – 
they are signiÞ cantly higher in each Visegrad country (according to 2012 
data) than in the year of accession, and always well above the EU average. 
Consequently, domestic (both private and public) investments were declining 
which was to some extent eased by EU assistance. However, in this respect the 
Visegrad countries seemed to undergo a long learning process: by mid-2013 
not even the half of Þ nancial support earmarked in the period of 2007-2013 for 
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the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary could actually be spent in those 
beneÞ ciaries, while the best performing Poland reached nearly 60% by that 
time.15 Thanks to the n+2 rule, the Visegrad countries still had time until the 
end of 2015 to use up the EU funds which has indeed been speeded up in all 
of them recently. By mid-2015, the contracting ratio was below 100% only in 
the Czech Republic (96%), but the payment ratio was still just 87% in Hungary, 
78% in Poland, 69% in the Czech Republic and 65% in Slovakia.16 In general, 
the Visegrad countries tended to spend most of the money from the EU funds on 
physical infrastructure17 which was understandable given their backwardness 
in this respect. But thanks to the new rules, the current cycle is likely to be 
dominated by investments promoting small and medium sized enterprises and 
job creation. Medium-term forecasts of the Economist Intelligence Unit show 
that the Visegrad countries will be characterised in general by investment 
growth in line with or above their GDP growth rates in the coming years; 
although differences among their performances may be considerable.  
As regards employment and unemployment – as can be seen in Figures 7 and 
8 – in the dynamic period between accession and the crisis the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and especially Poland (starting from the worst position) managed to 
steadily improve these rates. Employment went up and unemployment fell to 
historically low levels (due also to outmigration of labour especially from Poland). 
While both labour market indicators took a spectacularly improving path in 
three Visegrad countries, the Hungarian Þ gures – due to mismanagement of 
the economy – went into the opposite direction: in parallel with slowing growth 
and investments after accession, employment decreased and unemployment 
increased. The crisis broke the positive trends in the three members of the group 
but a few years later, recovery of labour market indicators started everywhere. 
According to European Commission forecasts, the visible improving trends will 
continue in 2016 too. Only Slovakia will still have a two-digit above-EU-average 
unemployment rate in the Visegrad region, while the employment rate will be 
rising until the same year.18 Here some exchange of good practices might also 
be useful, including the high share of self-employed and of the elderly at work 
coupled with a low share of early retired in the best performer Czech Republic, 
or the job protection action plan (protecting among others the younger-than 25 
15 Information taken from Insideurope website: http://insideurope.eu/ 
16 KPMG (2015) 
17 Ibid.
18 European Commission (2015a)
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and the older-than 55) as well as the public work programmes (designed partly 
to lead people back to the labour market) in Hungary. 
Figure 7: Employment rate (20-64), % Figure 8: Unemployment rate, %
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2015a)
Finally, productivity and innovation are also key factors of competitiveness 
where the Visegrad countries are still facing challenges. Regarding the former, 
as illustrated by Figure 9, in terms of labour productivity per person employed, 
the V4 are all lagging behind the EU average by some 20-30 percentage points. 
Despite the initial convergence of all four countries upon accession, the Czech 
performance has been worsening in the past few years. Poland, on the other 
hand, after some initial stagnation, has registered a spectacular catching up by 
over 12 percentage points between 2007 and 2013; thanks mainly to improved 
productivity in the manufacturing, energy services and construction sectors.19 
After some convergence upon accession, the overall Hungarian performance 
has recently been rather stagnating. In the V4 group Slovakia has by far the 
best record in labour productivity (on average by 10 percentage points higher 
compared to its Visegrad partners) thanks primarily to signiÞ cant pick-up in the 
manufacturing sector in the past few years.20 In harmony with the overall still 
weak productivity performance of the V4 against the EU average, according 
to Eurostat data, their real unit labour cost growth rates have recently been in 
general negative (with the exception of Slovakia) and are forecast21 to remain 
negative until 2016. Even if – due to the mentioned still big wage level gaps – the 
price of labour should continue to catch up with Western European standards, 
it should go hand in hand with steady improvement of labour productivity, to 
avoid a loss of competitiveness. 
19 European Commission (2013a) 37. 
20 European Commission (2013b) 45.
21 European Commission (2015a).
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It is also relevant to evoke here the innovation performance of the V4. The 
European Commission publishes each year the complex index (composed of 
25 indicators) of the EU countries’ performances (including among others the 
gross expenditure on research and development, the contribution to innovation 
by the enterprise sector, the number of patent applications or that of new 
doctorate graduates). According to this index,22 the performance of the Visegrad 
countries is also well below the EU average. From among the four categories 
(deÞ ned by the Commission) none of them is in the range of innovation leaders 
or innovation followers. In the 2015 innovation report all Visegrad countries are 
classiÞ ed as moderate innovators – including Poland which has just managed 
to move up from the lowest category of modest innovators. Figure 10 certainly 
suggests some catching up by the V4, but this is a policy area where much 
greater efforts are needed in the coming years (and for which there are now 
increased resources available in the multiannual budget of 2014-2020). 
Figure 9: Labour productivity per 
person employed
Figure 10: Innovation index
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2015b)
4. Public Þ nances and monetary developments 
Sound public Þ nances are not only an obligation under the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, but actually also building blocks of a country’s competitiveness. The 
Visegrad countries entered the EU with very different levels of budget deÞ cit 
but – as Figure 11 shows – by 2007 three of them managed to put their public 
households in order (similarly to the EU average). The only exception has been 
Hungary which – in parallel with a slowing GDP and lack of prudent Þ scal 
policy – took a sharply diverging path and accumulated a huge (9.4% of GDP) 
budget deÞ cit by 2006. Thus, from 2007 onwards, Hungary – under excessive 
22 European Commission (2015b).
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deÞ cit procedure practically since accession – had to make considerable efforts 
to consolidate its budget and, as a consequence, the country was hit by the crisis 
in the midst of austerity measures. Due to these developments, and contrary to 
the other Visegrad countries, Hungary had no room of manoeuvre to temporarily 
relax its Þ scal discipline. While the European Commission put a pressure on 
Hungary to cut back its deÞ cit, it also brought all the other Visegrad countries 
under the excessive deÞ cit procedure in 2009. Thanks to serious efforts by the 
Hungarian government, the country was Þ nally released from EDP in 2013, 
followed by the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2014 and by Poland in 2015.23 
Figure 11: General government balance, 
% of GDP
Figure 12: General government gross 
debt, % of GDP
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2015a)
Figure 11 shows the improvement of budgetary positions of the V4 in the 
post-crisis period. When looking at the methods applied to increase revenues 
and rationalise expenditure, it can be stated that the four countries introduced 
on both sides many similar but also several country-speciÞ c steps. Table 3 
summarises in a simpliÞ ed way the most important anti-crisis measures taken 
in the past few years by the Visegrad countries – leading Þ nally in all of them 
to a budget deÞ cit below 3% of GDP by 2015. 
Table 3: Main anti-crisis Þ scal measures in the V4 (2011–2014)
Revenue side CZ HU PL SK Expenditure side CZ HU PL SK
VAT and excise duty 
hike 
* * * * Freeze/cuts in public 
sector wages
* * * *
Combatting tax-
evasion/improving tax 
collection
* * * * Freeze/cuts in social 
beneÞ ts
* *
Increase in social 
security contributions
* * Lower indexation of 
pensions
*
Freeze of personal 
income tax thresholds, 
broadened base of PIT 
* * Increasing of 
retirement age
* * * *
23 Overview of excessive deÞ cit procedures (as of 10 August 2015): http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_Þ nance/economic_governance/sgp/corrective_arm/index_en.htm 
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Revenue side CZ HU PL SK Expenditure side CZ HU PL SK
Rising corporate 
income tax
* Cuts in government 
consumption
* * * *
Full/partial elimination 
of the private pension 
pillar24
* * * * Cuts in government 
investment
* * *
Introduction of lottery 
tax
* Reduction of certain 
subsidies
* * * *
New energy-related fee * * Reduction in payments 
to farmers
*
Bank levy and/or 
Þ nancial transaction 
duty
* * Capital injection into a 
development bank
*
Special sectoral taxes * * * Wage increase in some 
public services
* * *
Sale of frequencies * * Debt assumption of 
local governments
*
Sale of emergency 
oil stocks and carbon 
emission rights
*
Privatisation *
24Source: Stability/Convergence Programmes of the V4, 2011-201425
The different conventional and non-conventional measures applied to 
consolidate the public budgets also led to some increase of the state’s role in 
redistribution in the region, which however should decline again until 2018, 
according to each stability/convergence programme of the V4, as published in 
April 2015.
The other pillar of public Þ nances is the level of indebtedness by the state. 
Here the Visegrad countries had very different initial positions but all of them 
remained below the Maastricht benchmark of 60% of GDP in 2004. As Figure 
12 demonstrates it, after accession, the Hungarian rate – due to the mentioned 
mismanagement of Þ scal policy – took a steep upward direction until the crisis, 
while in the other Visegrad countries this level was stagnating or declining. As a 
response to the crisis, these governments thus had a greater room of manoeuvre 
to accumulate higher debts, while always remaining under 60% of GDP. 
Moreover, none of these states’ stability or convergence programme calculates 
with ever breaching this threshold in the foreseeable future. At the same time, 
Hungary – in parallel with budgetary consolidation – started to successfully cut 
24 All four Visegrad countries revised their mandatory private pension system. Poland and 
Slovakia decided to eliminate it partially, while Hungary opted for its full abolishment, and 
the Czech Republic will do the same by January 2016 (it was a voluntary system, with an 
obligation to stay in it after entry).
25 Those documents can be retrieved here: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_Þ nance/economic_
governance/sgp/convergence/index_en.htm 
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back its debt ratio after 2011.26  It must also be mentioned that three countries 
already have a public debt ceiling in their constitutions or high-level laws: for 
Poland and Slovakia it is 60%, for Hungary it is 50% of GDP, and – in parallel 
with joining the Fiscal Compact – the Czech Republic is preparing for a similar 
step (by putting the constitutional limit at 55%).
Finally, when looking at the monetary environment since accession: after 
very hectic and heterogeneous developments between 2004 and 2013 – as can 
be seen in Figure 13 on inß ation and in Figure 14 on long-term interest rates – 
recently very promising converging trends can be detected. As regards the 
harmonised indices of consumer prices, they reached historically low levels: 
somewhere around zero in both 2014 and 2015, while medium term forecasts by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit calculate with an inß ation rate of between ca. 
2-3% across the Visegrad region until 2019 – resulting in the most harmonious 
price developments since accession. Similarly, gaps among long-term interest 
rates have been quite substantial in the region, mainly due to the extremely 
high rates in Hungary. Recently however, as shown by Figure 14, thanks to the 
monetary policy in both Hungary and Poland, the 10 year bond yields started a 
gradual convergence to each other as well as to the EU average. These processes 
have to be welcomed and – together with the above mentioned public Þ nance 
efforts – should be seen as a smoother way leading up to the introduction of 
the single currency also by the three bigger Visegrad countries. Based on 
the described facts and forecasts, it is not unrealistic to foresee a (desirably) 
common joining of the euro area in the Þ rst half of the next decade, provided 
that the favourable nominal convergence trends will continue and the zloty, the 
koruna and the forint would all join the ERM-2 system in the foreseeable future. 
In parallel, real convergence should continue too, and a further key prerequisite 
is of course that there will be no political obstacles to entering the eurozone in 
any of these countries. 
26 With a view to diminishing the vulnerability of this process, the Hungarian public debt 
management authority has been systematically cutting back debt denominated in foreign 
currencies (36% in 2015, down from 40% in 2013), while broadening the base of forint-
denominated bonds and securities.
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Figure 13: HICP inß ation rate, % Figure 14: Long-term interest rates*, %
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2015a),
*EMU criterion series for ten year government bond yields
5. Summary and conclusions 
This study attempted to give a snapshot of the experience and performance 
of the Visegrad countries in the Þ rst decade of EU membership along a set 
of important aspects, as well as to make some medium-term projections with 
the help of forecasts. In the analysed developments a clear sequencing of three 
stages could be identiÞ ed: the post-accession and pre-crisis years (2004-2008) 
of diverging but mostly improving macroeconomic trends especially by Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the crisis years (2009-2013) of recession, 
stagnation or low growth and gradual recovery/consolidation, and Þ nally the 
post-crisis years (2014 and beyond) marked by harmonious converging trends 
to each other, as well as to several EU averages/benchmarks. 
As regards growth trends, the four countries joined the EU with around 5% 
rates which have been signiÞ cantly diverging until 2014. While Poland, the 
Czech Republic and especially Slovakia got an impetus from membership, the 
Hungarian economy has been on a declining path after 2004 just to experience 
the worst recession in the group in 2009. Recovery from contraction (Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia) or slower growth (Poland) has been happening 
at different paces again, however, growth rates were in harmony in the V4 in 
2014, i.e. between 2-3.6%. According to forecasts, the region may enjoy an 
economic expansion of the same pace until 2019 which would mean the most 
homogenous development since the year of EU entry. It will however allow for 
only a modest continuation of catching up by the region to the EU and euro area 
averages, as growth rates for both will be close to 2% throughout the forecast 
period. As it was evidenced, the Visegrad region is actually characterised by 
a protracted catching-up process at the national, regional and wage levels too. 
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Regarding national and regional convergence Slovakia and Poland were the best 
performers while in terms of wages the Czech Republic took the lead. All in all, 
the V4 countries did converge to each other as well as to the EU, but they need 
a very long way to reach EU averages in national and wage levels and to bring 
up all their regions at least to the 75% level (in terms of GDP per capita) of the 
Union average.  
When analysing labour market and investment developments, it was 
demonstrated that very positive pre-crisis trends in Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia were interrupted by the crisis. Employment, unemployment and 
gross Þ xed capital formation rates have been spectacularly improving in those 
three countries while in Hungary these indicators took a deteriorating trend 
after accession, thus leaving the country in an extremely weak position by 2009. 
In the past few years, steadily improving trends on the Visegrad countries’ 
labour markets can be detected while investments are still sluggish. The latter 
is however not due to lower foreign direct investments in general, but to the 
shrinking private and public investment activities resulting from ailing demand 
and austerity measures during the crisis years. At the same time, investments 
are boosted now by EU funds, as big parts of the money earmarked for the 
Visegrad countries between 2007-2013 have to be spent until the end of 2015, 
which add up to the new resources available for the 2014-2020 framework. 
In the case of external balances, the mostly negative pre-crisis trends seem to 
improve in the post-crisis period as exports of goods are growing dynamically 
(although still inferior to imports in Poland). Thus the current account balances 
took very positive trends with surpluses in Hungary and Slovakia, as well as 
in the Czech Republic since 2015. Poland is the only Visegrad country where 
this indicator remains negative and is again deteriorating, signalling some 
challenges of competitiveness in this respect.
Last but not least, compliance with the Maastricht benchmarks were also 
scrutinised shortly. Here too, very positive achievements were disrupted by the 
crisis in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while the unprecedented 
mismanagement of the Hungarian public Þ nances left the country in an 
extremely vulnerable state by the crisis. Thus Hungary had to start with Þ scal 
stabilisation earlier than the other three countries without, at the same time, 
having any room of manoeuvre to relax its budgetary discipline and debt policy. 
The situation was recently reversed: while – thanks to a mix of measures 
aiming at spreading the burdens across all the actors of the economy – Hungary 
could Þ nally be released from the excessive deÞ cit procedure in 2013, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia followed it in 2014 and Poland only in 2015. The 
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promising consolidation processes in all four countries seem to keep budget 
deÞ cits under 3% also in the medium run. In parallel, public debts are gradually 
declining in high-rate Hungary while – despite increases until 2013 – could be 
kept below 60% of GDP in the other three Visegrad countries. The stabilising 
public Þ nance trends are recently coupled with stabilising monetary trends too, 
which – in case of their continuation – may result in the three bigger Visegrad 
countries’ introduction of the euro in the Þ rst half of the next decade. In any 
case, given the signiÞ cance of political and economic relations among the four 
countries, a common joining to the eurozone by the three outsiders would be 
desirable.   
In this study it was shown that within the Visegrad group, Hungary used 
to be the “black sheep” under most of the analysed aspects between accession 
and the crisis; meaning that it was not able to grasp the opportunities offered 
by membership and used by its Visegrad peers more successfully. But in the 
past few years this speciÞ city has been fading away, and recently there seems 
to be more converging trends among the V4, as well as by the region to EU 
averages/benchmarks than ever before. Furthermore, according to forecasts, 
those favourable trends may continue in the medium-term which provides a 
positive answer to the question asked in the title.
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